Even citizens concerned about the threat of climate change are reluctant to endorse local policies if ...

24.01.2023

... if they believe that citizens in other countries do not support such policies. – A social dilemma that Simon Columbus is trying to model in a newly developed experimental game. On a recent visit, he and the EnvPsy team discuss his model and results to date.

The Social Dilemma of Climate Policy

Simon Columbus (University of Copenhagen) and Robert Böhm (University of Vienna)

Institutional solutions are needed to combat climate change. Yet, efficient global institutions may impose costs on local communities. This creates a social dilemma in the choice of climate policies. In this context, citizens may be opposed to globally efficient policies if they believe that other countries will not adopt similar steps to fight climate change. We first conducted a cross-national survey (N = 604, Germany and US) which showed that even citizens who are concerned about the threat of climate change are reluctant to endorse local policies if they believe that citizens in other countries do not support such policies. Building on this correlational evidence, we developed a new experimental game which models the social dilemma of climate policy. In this game, group members can vote on policies which maximise local or global efficiency. We aim to use this game to study (a) support for locally costly, but globally efficient policies, (b) whether individuals are more willing with globally efficient policies if they are established democratically, and (c) the effect of intergroup trust on support for globally efficient policies and policy compliance. Insights from this project have the potential to inform interventions to promote support for efficient climate policies.

Check also simoncolumbus.com